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   Williams, History, and ‘the impurity of philosophy’ 
 
 All respect then for the good spirits that may rule in these historians of 
morality!  But it is, unhappily, certain that the historical spirit itself is lacking in 
them, that precisely all the good spirits of history itself have left them in the 
lurch!   As is the hallowed custom with philosophers, the thinking of all of them 
is by nature unhistorical; there is no doubt about that.  
    Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, essay I, 2 
 
 A major part of the contribution of Bernard Williams to philosophy lies in the wealth and 
variety of his studies of great figures in the history of philosophy, beginning with his book on 
Descartes, through to his path-breaking work on Homer and Greek tragedy in Shame and 
Necessity, his later work on Nietzsche, and the general historical sweep of his last book Truth 
and Truthfulness.  It is primarily in his practice as a philosopher that he demonstrates so 
powerfully the importance of the history of philosophy for the contemporary practice of 
philosophy.  He was also, of course, deeply reflective about the fact that philosophy is a 
discipline with a special relation to its history, that it doesn't shed its history but continues to be 
defined by it even in its current practice.  He was concerned, among other things, with the 
question of what it says about philosophy as a discourse that aspires to be a form of 
knowledge, and therefore progressive in one way or another, that it is yet in continual 
confrontation with its history, as a resource for comprehension and critique of the present.   
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 In this paper I will try to say something interconnected about the meaning of the 
importance of history and historical understanding in Williams' work, and the relation of this 
emphasis of his to several other themes in his later philosophical writing.  Particularly in his 
later work, Williams was concerned to claim an importance for history in the self-understanding 
of the practice of philosophy that went well beyond the usefulness of including works of the 
past in a philosophy curriculum.   There are several different facets to this.   One such 
expression occurs in his late essay 'Philosophy as a humanistic discipline' (Williams 2006a).   He 
is speaking of how the contemporary philosopher may understand the transition from the 
political and ethical ideas that characterize the pre-modern world to those which characterize 
liberal democracies, and asks in what sense the contemporary philosopher can see these later 
ideas as having won out over the others.   If, for example, for the modern ideas of individual 
freedom and equality to have ‘won’ means something more vindicating than merely having 
displaced the earlier ideas, then the philosopher must face the fact that the very ‘forms of the 
argument, call them liberal forms of argument, are a central part of the outlook we accept’ (p. 
190)   This realization raises a question of what a satisfyingly vindicating account of such a 
transition could look like, one that did not simply re-assert the dominance of the historically 
later forms of thought over the ones they displaced.   As Williams goes on to say,  
 
 There are indeed, or have been, stories that try to vindicate historically 
one or another modern conception, in terms of the unfolding of reason, or a 
growth in enlightenment, or a fuller realization of freedom and autonomy which 
is a constant human objective; and there are others.  Such stories are unpopular 
at the moment, particularly in the wide-screen versions offered by Hegel and 
Marx. With philosophers in our local tradition the stories are unpopular not so 
much in the sense that they deny them, as that they do not mention them.  They 
do not mention them, no doubt, in part because they do not believe them, but 
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also because it is not part of a philosophical undertaking, as locally understood, 
to attend to any such history.  But—and this is the point I want to stress—we 
must attend to it, if we are to know what reflective attitude to take to our own 
conceptions.  p. 191 
 
 
We cannot know what attitude to take toward our own conceptions because, in the absence of 
an understanding of what a genuinely vindicating historical account would be, the philosopher 
can be reduced simply to saying that ‘the earlier outlook fails by arguments the point of which 
is that such outlooks should fail by them.’ (191).  Here then, a particular form of historical 
understanding is claimed as requisite for the contentful philosophical self-confidence in 
contemporary conceptions and forms of argument, something beyond the self-congratulation 
of the succeeding tradition.    
 The history of philosophy also contributes to the reflective understanding of 
contemporary conceptions in providing a kind of Verfremdungseffekt for the conceptual 
landscape we take for granted, the role of history, as he puts it, in ‘making the familiar looks 
strange, and conversely’ (181, n. 2).  This is part of the critical role of studying philosophy 
historically, as well as its importance in releasing the constraints on philosophical imagination 
that come with a certain professionalization of the subject.   As he puts it in his essay on 
Collingwood, ‘the point of reading philosophers of the past is to find in them something 
different from the present—and that is not just a historical but a philosophical discovery’ 
(Williams  2006b: 344)  However, a more distinctive claim that he makes in the same essay is 
that ‘philosophy's engagement with history go a long way beyond its concern with its own 
history, though that is certainly part of it’. ('Humanistic':  181).  This thought brings in history 
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not just in the sense of a succession of ideas or theories within the discourse of philosophy 
itself, but places philosophy and its self-understanding within the wider domain of history itself, 
the story of the various forces and institutions that issue in the heterogeneous demands 
(scientific, political, and literary, among others) that produce the forms of understanding that 
have been called philosophical over the centuries.   This is of a piece with what Williams 
elsewhere calls ‘the impurity of philosophy’1, that it is in the nature of its own concerns that it 
must concern itself with forms of knowledge outside of any a priori self-definition of its proper 
aims and methods.  Finally, largely implicit in these remarks, but still important to this theme in 
his work, is the model of the discipline of the study of history as a paradigmatic form of 
humanistic understanding, something which the legacy of positivism in philosophy still renders 
difficult to discern as a distinctive form of knowledge, finding no natural home for history as a 
form of knowledge between the more familiar poles of the natural sciences, on the one hand, 
and the a priori disciplines of logic and mathematics on the other.  The discipline of history, he 
suggests, can be a paradigm for the disciplinary self-understanding of philosophy, in the sense 
of an exemplary object of comparison, which can help correct some of its illusions about itself, 
particularly with respect to certain ideals of self-sufficiency.2    
 Let me begin with a tension between a thesis of the autonomy of some region of 
discourse or some human practice (e.g., morality or human conventions generally), and the 
acknowledgement of its historical character.   Such claims to autonomy may take various forms.  
In the case of morality, it may take the form of claiming that while moral systems and traditions 
necessarily evolve within specific historical circumstances, the specifically normative status of 
moral claims themselves is independent of these forces and their change and development.   
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Often the thought here is that to deny this would be to fail to understand the difference 
between normative and descriptive claims, or to fall victim to some version of the genetic 
fallacy.  In the case of human practices and conventions more broadly, the claim to some form 
of autonomy may take the form of claiming that human practices generally are constituted by 
the meanings and forms of thought which are internal to the practices themselves, and thus 
that no perspective fully outside of those conceptions can claim even to describe the practices, 
let alone to explain them.   Claims of this form are sometimes associated with Wittgenstein, and 
with certain trends in European social thought. In both the case of morality and the case of 
human practices generally, the claim to a form of autonomy is made by way of resisting the 
threat of various forms of reductionism or of de-bunking explanation coming from some other 
discourse, which might be one of the natural sciences, of Nietzschean genealogy, evolutionary 
psychology, or certain forms of critical social theory.   
  As the list of examples suggests, reductive or 'unmasking' discourses thrive and multiply 
on the current philosophical scene, and in many places it seems to go without saying that the 
very form of philosophical understanding just is to reduce one phenomenon to another one, 
often simply whatever natural or social science the writer is most familiar with or confident 
about.   And at the same time such reducing projects spawn their own reactions, which are 
often merely defensive ones, which take the space of available options to consist in claims of a 
purely self-defining autonomy for the phenomenon threatened with reduction, as though 
progressively isolating it from reach of the empirical and historical were the price of rescuing it 
from obliteration altogether.    Particularly in his later work, Williams is responding to all these 
intellectual currents and seeking to chart a path that is at once historical and skeptical in the 
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tradition of Nietzchean genealogy, but at the same time resolutely resistant to the reductive 
claims of some new or old science to displace the internal or participants perspective on our 
practices altogether.  
 In the collection of his articles  Making Sense of Humanity (Williams:  1995) and 
particularly in the section-heading 'Philosophy, evolution, and the human sciences', he resists 
the idea that a scientific study of human nature, one that explores the continuity of human 
nature with that of other animals, can either displace the level of description of cultural forms, 
or reveal them to be merely epiphenomenal.  At the same time, and in the same essays, he 
rejects a form of resisting such reducing claims, one that he sometimes associates with 
Wittgenstein, and sometimes with forms of social theory (neo-Hegelians are mentioned) which 
claim an exaggerated autonomy, or coherence, or self-sufficiency to human practices and 
institutions, as though to insulate them from the reductive claims of competing discourses.3    
For Williams the appeal to historical understanding in philosophy is part of a battle fought on 
two fronts simultaneously:  against the claims of a reductive naturalism, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, against various theses of the autonomy or self-sufficiency of philosophy and its 
topics which would allow no room for forms of non-reductive naturalism, most especially the 
forms of investigation associated with a Nietzschean practice of genealogy.    
 Something philosophy should help us to understand is the depressingly familiar fact 
about our intellectual world that a facile rhetoric of unmasking is often the very form in which 
knowledge of human life within culture and history must present itself if it is going to have the 
sound of knowledge at all for a contemporary audience, whether the context is a political one 
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associated with the critique of institutions from the left, or more commonly in the American 
academic context where the stance of unmasking is assumed habitually, outside of the context 
of any political project, as simply following from a commitment to naturalistic forms of 
explanation (typically psychological, though not restricted to that). It is as though for the 
ordinary forms and practices of human life, the only guise in which genuine knowledge or 
understanding of them could be recognized as such was that of the reductive displacement of 
those cultural and historical categories themselves.  Against the background of such warring 
ideologies, it can seem that the idea of any alternative to these various 'unmasking' forms of 
understanding human phenomena could only be the expression of a pre-scientific complacency 
about the sufficiency of our most superficial forms of self-understanding and the folkways 
within which they are embedded.   
 One general name for various alternative, non-reduced, forms of understanding is 
'humanistic', and this is part of what I take Williams to mean when he says that he takes ‘history 
to be a central case of a humanistic study’. ('Humanistic’: 180).   'Humanistic' disciplines may be 
thought of as those which concern themselves with human affairs within a certain range and 
within certain forms of discourse, and which seek among other things to explore the forms of 
self-understanding such discourses make possible.   This definition has to remain rough, since it 
is not possible to characterize what these discourses are other than by example and contrast.  
Thus while human biology is, of course, itself a human phenomenon, the study of biology is not 
counted as a humanistic discipline, whereas certain forms of studying history, politics or the 
arts will be so counted. Still remaining at this rough level we can say the following:   a 
humanistic discipline concerns itself with human phenomena, such as human practices, 
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institutions, and texts which are not only subject to various forms of understanding (as are the 
phenomena of human biology) but which embody in themselves forms of human 
understanding.   For instance, it is essential and not accidental to what an object such as a text 
is, or to what a human practice, like hiring labor is that it exists within the context of certain 
forms of thought (certain languages, certain kinds of human relation) and that certain forms of 
understanding are internal to them.   As objects of study, they are, in this sense, already 
themselves forms of human understanding before the formation of an academic discipline to 
study them.  It does not follow from this that such an academic discipline can only aim to 
‘recover’ the meaning already inherent in the phenomena themselves, nor that the very 
phenomena themselves cannot be profitably studied from scientific or naturalistic perspectives 
outside the conceptual world of the practices or institutions themselves.  It does, however, 
raise questions about how this distance is to be negotiated if the 'external' discipline is to 
remain in contact with the shape of the phenomenon it seeks to explain, as well as questions 
about the ambition of any such external discourse either to undermine or replace the internal 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. For instance, at a very basic level, in seeking to 
understand something that is a text, the investigator is obliged to see it as something 
constituted by the institution of the language it was written in, and the specific forms of 
understanding which are internal to it.  The displacement of this framework and set of 
categories from the project of understanding such an object would take one outside the 
understanding of texts altogether.  To abstract from that level of description and the forms of 
understanding internal to it, would be to lose contact with it as the particular kind of object of 
study that it is.   
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 In thinking about the relations of philosophical and historical understanding, R. G. 
Collingwood (‘the most unjustly neglected of twentieth-century British philosophers’)4 has 
always been a touchstone for Williams.  In The Idea of History (Collingwood: 1946) Collingwood 
makes a distinction between the scientific understanding of natural phenomena and of human 
affairs and human institutions (in this passage he is paraphrasing Schelling, but he makes the 
thought his own).    
Nature consists of things distributed in space, whose intelligibility consists 
merely in the way in which they are distributed, or in the regular and 
determinate relations between them. History consists of the thoughts and 
actions of minds, which are not only intelligible but intelligent, intelligible to 
themselves, not merely to something other than themselves: because they 
contain in themselves both sides of the knowledge-relation, they are subject as 
well as object.   (Collingwood 1946: 112) 
 
There are two ways of objecting to the letter of what Collingwood says here, but which I think 
his broader point survives.  It may be objected that the sharp distinction he draws between 
History and Nature neglects the fact that purely natural phenomena have histories as well, and 
that even the traditional history of states and empires depends on the vicissitudes of the 
natural world within which wars, empires, and elections take place.  For the moment, let’s 
assume there is a rough, workable distinction between such things as the natural history of 
species, on the one hand, and the history of human affairs and institutions as it has traditionally 
been represented in history departments, on the other.  (The current evolution of 
historiographic trends like ecological history and so-called ‘Big History’ complicate 
Collingwood’s distinction in further ways but do not, I think, abolish the difference he had in 
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mind.)   Second, the identification of the history of specifically human affairs with ‘the thoughts 
and actions of minds’ might seem an objectionable further restriction in the proper purview of 
the historian, for it suggests a focus on individual historical actors, and indeed on a specifically 
psychological form of understanding such actors.  There is no doubt that much of what 
Collingwood says about historical understanding as a form of imaginative ‘re-enactment’ is 
limited to such an individualist perspective (and Williams has some very useful things to say 
about how to interpret this side of Collingwood in his essay devoted to him).  But here again I 
don’t think we have to understand his basic insight in this restricted way.   The central 
distinction between objects of understanding which are intelligible or explicable to some 
outside perspective, and phenomena which are themselves already forms of intelligence and 
which embody a kind of understanding of themselves extends beyond the case of an individual 
mind or action, and applies just as much to particular institutions, practices, social and artistic 
movements.5     
 Like texts, the institutions of the family, the state, or of property are also phenomena 
which contain a conception of themselves as part of their very constitution.   In this they are 
unlike the phenomena of planetary motion or developmental biology, where there is no 
'internal understanding' or self-conception to begin with, let alone one that might be thought 
to play a constituting role for the phenomena themselves.   Human actions, practices, and 
institutions, by contrast, come into the world already embodying an understanding of 
themselves, for they are themselves forms of intelligibility (of human relations, of power, of 
forms of ownership).    Williams alludes to this fact in passages like the following, where he 
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rejects what he calls a ‘simple reductionist view’ of the relation between biology and culture, 
one which neglects what he calls:   
 … the way in which culture not only shapes but constitutes the 
vast mass of human behaviour.  When ancient Greek thought first 
discovered the opposition of 'nature' and 'convention', it also discovered 
that an essential part of human nature is to live by convention. The study 
of human nature is, in good part, the study of human conventions, and 
that is what it is from the strictest ethological point of view.  That is how 
this species is.  It is a claim additional to this, but one which I also believe 
to be true, that human conventions, at least beyond a certain state of 
elaboration, can be understood only with the help of history, and that the 
social sciences accordingly have an essential historical base.6 
 
 Three themes are announced in this passage.  One theme refers to the contrast 
between nature and convention, but goes on to problematize this contrast by claiming that it is 
part of human nature to live by convention.   A second theme is a contrast between a claim that 
culture (or convention) shapes human behavior and a stronger claim that culture (or 
convention) constitutes certain forms of human behavior.   And finally, there is the claim at the 
end of the passage that since human conventions can themselves only be understood with the 
help of history, ‘the social sciences accordingly have an essential historical base’.    
 To understand this last claim about history in a way that is relevant to the sense of 
history as a discipline of humanistic understanding we need to distinguish the kind of claim 
Williams makes here and elsewhere from the different observation that the objects and 
phenomena under investigation by astronomy or geology, for instance, also have histories, 
indeed histories which tell us a great deal not only about how these things came to be, but 
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indeed about what they essentially are.  For a similar-sounding claim could be made about the 
understanding of the development of species or indeed the geologic formation of continents.   
For these too, the understanding of them needs the story of how they came to be and the 
forces that shaped them.   With respect to human practices and conventions, however, 
historical understanding must not only trace the forces that shaped them, but must do so in a 
way that makes sense of the forms of thought that are constitutive of the practices and 
institutions themselves.  This is not a constraint on the historical understanding of continental 
drift or the origins of migratory birds.  In studying human practices and conventions, the 
historical understanding of them must be able to make sense of both the transpersonal level of 
the concepts and rules that constitute the convention, and the understanding of those concepts 
had by the participants in the convention.  I take this to follow from  Williams' claim that human 
conventions not only shape but constitute certain forms of human behavior themselves.   For it 
is in the nature of conventional practices to be constituted by an understanding of the 
convention that is internal to the practice itself, and that is shared by the parties to the 
convention, whether explicitly represented or not.  For example, the cultural phenomena of 
language, trade, and politics are what they are in virtue of forms of thought that define such 
relations as, e.g., the relation between asking a question and giving an answer, or between the 
roles of buyer and seller, and an understanding of them that is shared by the practitioners 
themselves.  The understanding of money and its history, for example, must ground itself in the 
fact that the phenomena of price, wage, and investment are themselves constituted by the 
concepts which are internal to the practices themselves.   Naturally this is not to say that the 
understanding of economic phenomena themselves, as well as their histories, does not go well 
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beyond the self-understanding of the participants in a given time and place, but it does mean 
that in the case of conventional human practices there is a conception of the activity that is 
internal to it, an irreducible element of the very phenomena to be understood. To abstract 
away from these understandings altogether would be to abandon the specific topics of money 
and price in favor of something else.   For even seeing the participants’ understanding as 
distorted with respect to their own practice requires the identification of that practice in terms 
of the concepts and relations internal to it.7    
  
 This implies that the very meaning of ‘historical understanding’ is something distinctive 
in the case of human conventions, different from the case of other natural phenomena whose 
histories are important to the understanding of their present configurations.  With respect to 
human practices and institutions ‘historical understanding’ does not simply mean a causal 
developmental story, but a story that in some way constrained to ‘save the phenomena’ of the 
forms of thought internal to the institution as such.  The history of trade in a certain region will 
interact with the history of climate in that same region, but for the historian to have the 
phenomena of exchange, sale, or debt as objects of investigation obliges him to refer to the 
self-understandings of the agents interacting in these ways, and the concepts that are part of 
the institution within which they act and make themselves intelligible to themselves and others.   
There is nothing parallel to this in the understanding of the history of the climate itself.   
Naturally these two forms of history will interact and form one larger phenomenon, as when 
the history of drought in some region is part of the explanation of the breakdown of relations of 
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trade.   But here as well, to understand the breakdown of these relations, as occasioned by 
conditions of drought, requires reference to the conventionally constituted relations which 
have broken down, and which tell us what ‘breaking down’ means in this context.   
 A consequence of the different sense of ‘historical understanding when it concerns 
human affairs, one which Williams emphasizes, is that historical memory has a role to play in 
the constitution and continuation of human practices themselves. That is to say, these 
phenomena do not simply have histories which leave their traces on current practice, as 
geologic history leaves its traces in the contemporary rock strata, but rather the current 
practice self-consciously refers back to that history for its contemporary understanding of itself.  
At the same time, however, Williams also associates this emphasis on practices and their 
internal understanding with a temptation he wishes to reject, and to which he sees a proper 
understanding of the role of history as a corrective.   In various places he is concerned with an 
internal tension in the idea of a properly historical understanding of a human institution, which 
stems from the competing demands to understand the phenomena ‘internally’, and at the 
same time to avoid a picture of the institution as self-sufficient; that is, either as perfectly 
coherent and without internal tensions, or as isolated from the rest of life, including natural 
forces and other competing institutions.    
  The reflective understanding of our ideas and motivations, which I 
take to be by general agreement a philosophical aim, is going to involve 
historical understanding.  Here history helps philosophical understanding, 
or is part of it. Philosophy has to learn the lesson that conceptual 
description (or, more specifically, analysis) is not self-sufficient; and that 
such projects as deriving our concepts a priori from universal conditions 
of human life, though they indeed have a place (a greater place in some 
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areas of philosophy than others), are likely to leave unexplained many 
features that provoke philosophical enquiry.   
     ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline’:  192         
 
 And in his essay on Collingwood, he says:   
 
     One has to make, not just a system, but a movement between various 
stages of systems, intelligible, and one thing that makes this possible is 
that in its earlier stage the system of thoughts, understandings or 
practices was in fact not fully coherent, but was under tension.   
Wittgensteinian accounts of social understanding have, notoriously, 
tended to favour a static picture of a fully functioning and coherent 
system.    (357) 
 
This last point is a Nietzschean one, given most definitive expression in the Genealogy of Morals 
in his remarks on the institution of punishment, where he traces the heterogenous tensions, 
drives and conflicts that have over time resulted in the current practice of punishment in a 
given time and place, where those tensions are not overcome but remain unresolved in the 
practice itself, culminating in the famous declaration that  ‘all concepts in which an entire 
process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has no history is 
definable.’8 Nietzsche's point here about punishment and history is not so much a point about 
‘definability’, since something may elude definition simply through being either essentially 
vague or being conceptually basic, and neither of these are what he has in mind.   Nor is it even 
so much about the alterations of a practice over time, since that poses no special problem for 
the understanding of either natural or conventional phenomena which have a developmental 
or cultural history.   The point for both Nietzsche and Williams more centrally concerns the fact 
that a single practice is the precipitate of several conflicting forces which have ‘crystalized’ in a 
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certain complex form that maintains a certain stability in a given time and place, but whose 
distinct elements may de-couple or disintegrate under the pressure of the competing forces 
which gave rise to it, and the conflicting rationales within which it is understood.   This general 
point about the historical character of institutions does indeed stand as a corrective to a certain 
philosophical picture of what it would have to be to 'define' a phenomenon like punishment, as 
well as the limits of what Williams describes above as ‘projects such as deriving our concepts a 
priori from universal conditions of human life.’   The 'genealogical'  point also reveals a certain 
tension with the demand that the historical understanding of human practices see them as 
phenomena that are constituted by forms of thought internal to them, for these very 
constituting forms of thought will often themselves be internally conflicted.  However, the 
denial of essentialism with respect to a practice like that of punishment, and the 
acknowledgement of its contingent, conflicted, historical character does nothing to show that 
something can count as an act of punishment, for instance, apart from its being part of an 
institution within which the participants understand themselves to occupy certain roles with 
certain meanings (e.g., punisher and victim of punishment).     
 
 For Williams, the historically-informed philosophical understanding of a practice like 
that of punishment must avoid the twin temptations of either an essentialism concerning its 
internal meaning, or a reductionism that assumes it can treat that meaning as epiphenomenal 
and still have a human practice as its object of investigation.  The former temptation offers an 
unreal picture of human institutions as we know them that is, as isolated from the complex of 
empirical social forces that sustain them, and which obscures from view the very possibility of 
17 
 
historical change in a practice or an institution. The latter temptation imagines that the 
participants point of view, and the transpersonal level of concepts governing a given practice,  
can simply be detached from it, as though these forms of understanding were simply external 
to the practice in the manner of a description of it, rather than as playing  a constituting role.  
From such an external perspective, it can seem possible to see the self-understanding of a 
practice as a whole as simply a superstructure of mystification, superimposed on a ground-level 
reality that has nothing to do with the categories and concepts of the practices themselves, and 
which a replacement vocabulary will show to be dispensable if not simply unreal.   It is here that 
the rhetoric of unmasking, as part of our contemporary Zeitgeist, reveals itself as a common 
animating spirit for both the various strategies of reductionism in contemporary analytic 
philosophy and the old masters of the hermeneutics of suspicion.    
 Nietzsche himself is a usefully ambiguous figure here for exhibiting these difficulties.   
His famous aphorism from Beyond Good and Evil, ‘There are no moral phenomena at all, but 
only a moral interpretation of phenomena’ (§ 108) occurs there in isolation, but is clearly 
presented as a summation of central strands in his thinking about morality, and about 
interpretation itself.   The forthright expression of this aphorism makes its own interpretation 
seem more straightforward than it really can be.  In the context of thinking about the rhetoric 
of unmasking, there are difficulties with taking this aphorism at face value, which stem from the 
general grammatical form of the statement of unmasking:   a familiar phenomenon or practice 
is named, and then said to be, in fact, ‘not that familiar thing, but really only this other thing’.  
We are told that there are in fact no phenomena as understood within a certain system of 
concepts, but only some other kinds of phenomena which are properly speaking outside that 
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system of concepts altogether.  In the present case we are told:  there are in fact no moral 
phenomena, but only moral interpretations of some other kind of phenomena (relations of 
‘power’, perhaps). The thought presented to us is that when looked at clearly, some familiar or 
taken for granted aspect of our experience is shown to be unreal, or to be really ‘only’ some 
other thing (perhaps something equally familiar, but still disillusioning in some way).   This 
gesture places the two terms in a special relation to each other.  The familiar aspect, which is to 
be unmasked, is in some sense shown to be some other thing, hence to be identical with it; but 
at the same time it cannot simply be identical with it, since the force of the word ‘only’ tells us 
that the familiar aspect does not survive, but rather only some diminished substitute for it.     
 
 A general difficulty in this rhetoric is in the suggestion that we have a kind of access to 
the ‘real’ phenomena themselves that would permit us to say what they are, prior to their 
having been interpreted morally.  In one way this is simply wrong as applied to phenomena 
such as punishment or forgiveness, where the phenomena themselves just are forms of moral 
interpretation.  (Punishment is not just any way of inflicting pain on someone or restricting 
someone’s freedom).   It is an illusion to think we have access to a neutral level of description of 
these very phenomena, prior to their being part of a practice.9   In another way, the bad idea 
would be a form of crude reductionism, according to which the only ‘real’ phenomena in 
human life are on the level of bodily responses like sensations of pleasure and pain, which then 
get ‘interpreted’ morally.    
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 A related difficulty stems from the sense of the word ‘only’, taken from a different 
direction; that is, the sense that when we say there are ‘only moral interpretations of 
phenomena’ we have a clear view of a kind of remainder that is the phenomenon left over after 
the unmasking operation, once this interpretation has been pulled away.  There is in this the 
suggestion that a moral interpretation of some phenomenon remains somehow external to it, 
simply laid on top of it, rather than constituting a different phenomenon.  Against this 
suggestion, consider the basic human practices of giving, taking, and receiving things.  If it is 
only within an institutional context, defining certain practices of exchange, that the physical 
transfer of certain objects from one set of human hands to another can count as the occurrence 
of an act of giving, stealing, or buying, then it will make no sense to say that the ‘real’ 
phenomenon in question is something that ‘merely’ gets interpreted as a gift, or as theft, or as 
returning something to its owner.  Rather, the action taking place within this context (including, 
but not reducible to, the understanding of the practice by its practitioners) is what makes these 
to be acts of giving or stealing or returning.  It is what brings into being those phenomena 
themselves, rather than ‘only’ something that bears a descriptive or masking relation to the 
genuinely real phenomena below.   Of course, the picture of interpretations as descriptions laid 
over some independently characterizable and fully real ground-level phenomenon is a very 
unNietzschean picture of interpretation, and one that he distances himself from elsewhere in 
speaking of the work of interpretation as creative and constituting.  But on that richer 
understanding of the meaning of the work of interpretation in the context of human practices, 
there is no room to say things of the form ‘there are no X-phenomena, but only X-
20 
 
interpretations of phenomena’.   That would make no more sense than to say that there are no 
economic phenomena (really), but only economic interpretations of (other) real phenomena.      
 What I've been calling the 'internal perspective' on a practice or institution is not itself a 
psychological notion, but refers directly to the practice itself and the norms, relations, and  
forms of activity that it defines and makes possible.  This perspective is not to be identified 
either with the individual understanding of the practice by one of its practitioners or by the 
understanding had by all of them taken together.  The examples of economic or legal 
institutions should make this clear.   They are human constructs, of course, but they are so in 
deeper sense than that in which a cathedral or a highway is a human construct.  For legal and 
economic institutions are not only the products of human activity, but are themselves active 
conventions, forms of intelligibility whose very reality depends on responses of understanding 
and recognition.  The price of a commodity or the validity of a law is in no way independent of 
the fact that people accept a certain price for the commodity and recognize the validity of the 
law.   As with conventions generally, absent the understanding and acceptance of the 
convention by the relevant participants, the convention itself ceases to exist.   It is easy to 
misinterpret this fact, however, for it does not follow from this that the meaning of the 
institution is therefore transparent to or exhausted by the understanding of it had by either a 
particular participant or by all the participants taken collectively.  Rather, the ’internal meaning' 
of an institution or practice is a description of the norms and concepts governing participation 
in the practice, as they are embedded in changing historical circumstances, transcending the 
memory or understanding of any individual or group of participants. The distinction between 
these two levels of description becomes particularly clear when we consider conventional 
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practices that are large, complex, and with long histories, such as those of economics and law.  
These are phenomena which are not simply human artifacts, but are ongoing forms of human 
activity constituted by forms of self-understanding, in a way that is not true of planets or blood-
cells, but which at the same time outdistance the understanding of them had by anyone 
participant in them.  The depth and complexity of the phenomena of economics or law, even at 
their most abstract and least dependent on empirical cirumstances, where the subject to be 
understood is most 'internal' to the formal structure of the institution, is something that 
extends well beyond any individual mind or any collection of minds.  In a perfectly 
straightforward sense, with respect to law, politics and the arts themselves we can only hope 
for a partial understanding of something that is our own human creation, indeed our own form 
of understanding.    
 
 Marx begins his materialist history of the French coup d'etat of 1851 with the famous 
words, ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make 
it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past’.10  This classic formulation announces a tension between the fact 
that human history is a human creation and the fact that this human creation takes place in a 
context beyond the choosing, and largely beyond the comprehension, of the historical actors 
themselves.  The past that transmits the circumstances within which ‘men make their own 
history’ includes both the historical memory within which historical agents understand and 
misunderstand their own deeds, and the long-forgotten history that nonetheless continues to 
shape the practices and institutions they inhabit and act within.  This past also includes, 
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crucially, such institutions as those of work, family, and law which precede any given historical 
events themselves and are the embodiment of the forms of thought within which such events 
take place and are understood by the historical agents.  The forms of thought in an institution 
like those of work, family, and law are themselves, of course, transpersonal, and are not to be 
found in the subjectivities of the agents themselves, either individually or collectively.    
  Marx's formulation captures three dimensions of historical understanding that can seem 
at odds with each other:  1)  that the object of history is a human creation and thus must be 
understood in terms that make sense of it as a human creation, something whose conflicts and 
ambitions occur within their own forms of understanding (unlike, e.g., the motion of the 
planets), 2) that these events are nonetheless only comprehensible within a context, both past 
and present, that is beyond the ambitions or the understanding of the historical agents 
themselves, and 3)  that this same past, unchosen and misrecognized, is nonetheless not 
merely what led up to these events and produced them (as with a natural phenomenon), but is 
something that gains expression in historical memory, and in this way forms part of the self-
understanding of the historical agents.   In one sense, the historical past is something simply 
given and external to the self-understanding of the historical agents, and in another sense it is 
the very form of how they understand what they are up to in their current situation, how they 
understand themselves and what they are doing.  Given these features of the objects of 
historical knowledge, and the basic fact of temporal difference itself, the historian is bound to 
understand the events and institutions of the past in terms which could not in principle have 
been available to the historical agents themselves.  This is true in the first instance because 
those historical agents cannot know the future they did not live to see, and a significant part of 
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the meaning of the events in which they participated in lies in the altered world that they 
produced.   Because of this, the historian is asking a set of questions about those events that 
could not in principle have been available to the agents or societies at the time, seeking to 
understand empirical and conceptual relations that could not have been part of their self-
consciousness at the time.  When the historian makes use of concepts such as the ‘medieval’ or 
‘early modern’ world view, we can be sure that, however indispensable such concepts may be 
for a kind of historical understanding, they were not concepts available to the people and 
institutions that are the object of such understanding.  Hence it can only be an illusion to think 
that an historical understanding attentive to the ‘self-constituting’ character of human 
institutions should or could strive to overcome the difference between the ‘outside’ 
perspective of the historian and the ‘inside’ of the institutions themselves.11   
 
 I want to close by suggesting that a form of understanding that negotiates something 
like this very set of tensions is part of what Williams finds important for philosophy's 
understanding of itself, and why the study of history presents itself to him as a model for such a 
form of knowledge. At its best, the practice of historical understanding can instruct philosophy 
in what it looks like for a discipline of knowledge to be faithful to two imperatives which often 
seem at odds with each other, and which in philosophy are difficult to combine in a single view.  
The first is the demand for a non-reductive understanding of the practices and institutions 
within which human activity and conflict take place, and which respects that fact that human 
practices are themselves forms of understanding, which have to be understood if the activities 
and conflicts themselves are to be understood. The second is a demand for a form of 
understanding that respects the fact that human practices (including practices like that of 
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philosophy itself) do not exist in a void, are not self-sufficient or transparent to themselves, do 
not form static, coherent wholes free of internal conflict or contradiction.   
 
 One lesson to be drawn from the centrality of historical understanding in Williams' later 
work is that the proper philosophical resistance to various ideologies of reduction does not lie 
in a claim to the self-defining autonomy of human forms of self-understanding, and cannot be 
found in the isolation of these forms from their historical and indeed biological embeddedness.   
Actual examples of historical understanding of human affairs and human practices show what it 
looks like in practice to negotiate the tension between ‘saving the phenomena’, where that 
means preserving the internal understanding of these practices, and at the same time showing 
the temporality, the partiality, and the contradictions of that internal understanding itself.   The 
study of history as a distinctive form of understanding has never occupied a central place in 
analytic philosophy, and its absence from philosophical imagination contributes directly to an 
impoverished sense of the space of alternatives in understanding human practices and 
institutions, as though we had to choose between the various forms of reductionism currently 
on offer or an unreal ideal of self-sufficiency and transparency.   Unlike the various forms of 
reductionism, the point of historical understanding is not the supplanting of the participants 
point of view by some master discourse which imagines itself outside the same forces it seeks 
to describe, but rather situating the practice within a world with a past and a future, which the 
practice is responding to but which necessarily extends beyond its own temporally situated self-
understanding.12   
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1
   ‘The fate, as I have described it, of the theoretical issue of objectivity reminds us in one way of the 
impurity of philosophy; if it is to have anything to say about that question, it will have to address a lot more 
than philosophy.’  (‘Saint-Just’s Illusion’, in Williams 1995: 148) 
 
2
   After making the claims for history just alluded to, Williams continues the essay with the thought that 
‘some of the deepest insights of modern philosophy, notably in the work of Wittgenstein, remain 
undeveloped  --- indeed, at the limit, they are rendered unintelligible  --  precisely because of an 
assumption that philosophy is something quite peculiar, which should not be confused with any other kind 
of study, and which needs no other kind of study in order to understand itself.’ (‘Humanistic’: 181-2).     
 
3
  Speaking of something he calls (in quotes) 'the Wittgensteinian cop-out’, he complains of an over-
reliance on the idea of ‘language-games’ for understanding human activities generally, and says of the 
phrase that ‘It suggests an autonomy of the human, under a defining idea of linguistic and conceptual 
consciousness, which tends to put a stop to any interesting questions of the biological kind before they 
even start’. ('Evolution, ethics, and the representation problem'', Williams 1995: 103). But lest this seem a 
dismissal of Wittgenstein’s thought itself, see the quotation from the 'Humanistic' essay in footnote 2.    
 
4
 Williams 2002:  237 
 
5
  Elsewhere in The Idea of History, Collingwood recognizes this trans-individual point:  ‘[Winckelmann] 
conceived a profoundly original idea, the idea that there is a history of art, not to be confused with the 
biographies of artists:  a history of art itself, developing through the work of successive artists, without 
their conscious awareness of any such development.  The artist, for this conception, is merely the 
unconscious vehicle of a particular stage in the development of art.   Similar ideas were applied 
afterwards by Hegel and other to the history of politics, philosophy, and other achievements of the human 
mind.’:. 88, n. 1 
 
6
 ‘Evolution, Ethics and the Representation Problem’, in Williams 1995: 103.  
 
7
 As an example:  To understand any period of American history is to understand the role of race in the 
law, in culture, in politics, in family life and intimate relationships, etc.   A history that was purged of such 
notions or which relegated them to the epiphenomenal would simply fail to describe, let alone explain, the 
phenomena we want and need to understand; all of which is consistent with the recognition of what is 
illusory in the very idea of race.   
 
 
8
   ‘As for the other element in punishment, the fluid element, its ‘meaning,’ in a very late condition of 
culture (for example, in modem Europe) the concept ‘punishment’ possesses in fact not one meaning but 
a whole synthesis of ‘meanings’: the previous history of punishment in general; the history of its 
employment for the most various purposes, finally crystallizes into a kind of unity that is hard to 
disentangle, hard to analyze and, as must be emphasized especially, totally indefinable. (Today it is 
impossible to say for certain why people are really punished: all concepts in which an entire process is 
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semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has no history is definable.): Nietzsche 1966: 
80   
 
9
   In a related context Williams says the following:   ‘The metaphysicians perhaps assume that there is a 
neutral item that cognitive science and 'folk psychology' are alike in the business of explaining, and that is 
behaviour.  But to suppose that there could be an adequate sense of 'behaviour' that did not already 
involve concepts of 'folk psychology' - the idea of an intention, in particular - is to fall back into a basic 
error of behaviourism.’ ('Evolution', in Williams 1995: 85) 
 
10
  ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, in Marx and Engels:  595 
 
11
 In this sense, the hermeneutical regulative ideal of a ‘fusing of horizons’ (Gadamer 2004) between the 
historian and the object of study describes something  neither possible nor desirable.  Collingwood’s ideal 
of historical understanding as a process of imaginative re-enactment of the thought of the historical actors 
seems to rest on a parallel error. 
 
 
12
  I am grateful to my hosts in London where I delivered the Mark Sacks Lecture in June 2015, and for 
the comments from the audience at the time, in particular a conversation with Lucy O’Brien. An earlier 
version of this paper was written for a conference on Bernard Williams at the University of Chicago in 
October 2011, and I thank Jonathan Lear for the occasion and Jim Conant for acting as commentator.  
Later I received particularly helpful responses from Luca Ferrero, Tim Scanlon, Ed Minar, and Fred 
Neuhouser.   
